Abstract: Recent research uses the degree of stock returns co-movement as a measure of the quality of a country"s information environment. It has been argued that stronger property rights, better corporate governance regimes and more efficient enforcement mechanisms lead to prices incorporating more firm-specific information and, therefore, co-moving less with the market. In this paper, we use a much more comprehensive international data set than in prior research, encompassing forty countries over twenty years, to evaluate the reliability of this approach in a crosscountry setting and to analyse the behaviour of the measure used. Our results demonstrate severe limitations in the use of co-movement as a measure of information quality. We highlight the instability of the measure and show that it can produce results that are often difficult to reconcile with such an informational explanation.
The use of the R 2 as a measure of firm-specific information: A cross-country critique 1. INTRODUCTION Morck et al. (2000: 215) claim that "stock prices move together more in poor economies than in rich economies". Rich economies tend to have stronger property rights, better corporate governance regimes and more efficient enforcement mechanisms, all of which promote arbitrage trading based on information about a firm"s fundamentals. In the presence of such an information environment, they argue, prices will incorporate more firm-specific information and, therefore, co-move less with the market.
The study of the quality of information environments at the cross-country level is of major relevance to both the investing community and regulators. Barriers to international trade are vanishing and at the same time capital mobility has been increasing and, therefore, investors need more country-specific information and a better understanding of international stock markets. At the same time, regulators are endeavouring to make strong efforts to harmonise both capital market regulations and financial reporting rules. The study of these matters helps us to understand the information dynamics, both within a country and at the cross-country level, and therefore hopefully will facilitate the formulation of more informed regulation. Morck et al."s (2000) approach uses the average R² for a country of a regression of a company"s stock returns on overall stock market returns as a proxy for the quality of a country"s information environment. The appeal of this approach is that it seems to provide a simple measure to evaluate the complex concept of information quality. The R² methodology has an intuitive logic behind it. In the extreme case where firm-level information is so poor that investors cannot distinguish between companies, they will be forced to treat them as essentially the same. Market-wide information will then be the major factor driving price changes, with consequently high R²s being observed.
1 High R 2 s might also be observed in a market where firms are generally large and well-diversified. On the other hand, if firms are generally focused in particular lines of business or where good sources of reliable firm-specific information are available then firms will not be viewed as substitutes by investors, and R 2 s should be small. This intuition underpins the use of R² as a metric for ranking countries according to the quality of their information environments.
Most subsequent research in this area takes for granted the reliability of R 2 as a measure of information. This paper critically analyses such use of R² at the crosscountry level. We show that such an informational interpretation of R² has to be treated with great care. We apply the R² methodology in a cross-country setting using a very comprehensive data set we have collected based on forty countries over the twenty-year period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Our results demonstrate clearly the inadequacy of the R² as a measure of the quality of the information environment. When attempting to measure the quality of firm-specific information at the country-level, there are many confounding factors to be accounted for, 2 raising severe doubts as to whether it is possible to encapsulate such a multiplicity of factors in a single measure.
Our approach can be summarized as follows. First, we rank countries according to their average R² for the whole period. We then consider whether the resulting ranking can be reconciled with what is generally known about the financial environments of the countries involved. Whilst the ranking presented by Morck et al. (2000) for the single year of 1995 is certainly plausible in terms of its association with particular country economic and legal variables, our ranking based on the average for the whole 20 years is very different and presents a puzzling picture. Furthermore, the annual R² for a single country changes considerably from year to year, a fact which is hard to reconcile with the argument that corporate governance and investor protection regimes are driving its behaviour. Such a relationship would only be possible if these factors change with rapidity and frequency, improving one year and falling back again in the next, circumstances which are highly unlikely.
To explore the implausible behaviour of R² further, we examine the spurious effects of aggregation and decomposition on the measure. We do this by artificially aggregating and decomposing real countries to create pseudo-countries and analyse their impact on R². When we create a bigger "country" by "merging" two smaller ones, we find that the resultant R² falls dramatically. We also explore the converse, by breaking a single country, the USA, into smaller pseudo-countries defined by the particular US stock market in which a firm is listed. We find that the R² of each pseudo-country is larger than that for the USA as a whole. By construction, these effects cannot be explained in terms of changes in the quality of the information environment or in the factors that Morck et al. (2000) claim to be driving R², i.e.
corporate governance and investor protection regimes.
Our study adds to the small but growing body of empirical work that examines the reliability of R², also commonly referred to as stock return synchronicity, as a measure of stock price informativeness. Pantzalis and Xu (2008) show that whilst large firms in the USA have greater price informativeness, synchronicity reveals nothing further when size is taken into account. Other studies examine the effects of noise on R² and reach different conclusions. Teoh and Yang (2008) show that R² is negatively correlated with noise and Shen (2008) The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses our sample and the metrics used in the paper.
Section 4 empirically explores the cross-country setting, by analysing in the different ways described above, anomalies in the behaviour of R² as a measure of information environment quality. Conclusions appear in the final section.
PRIOR RESEARCH
In this section, we outline the rationale underlying the R² methodology as a measure of information quality and explain how it has been used in empirical research. We then establish a context for the present study by summarising the growing body of work criticising the R² methodology. Morck et al. (2000) argue that strong property regimes provide the economic conditions conducive to information-driven arbitrage trading based on firms" fundamentals. As these conditions are generally found in developed countries and less so in developing ones, the stock prices of the former are likely to incorporate more firm-specific information than are the latter. Their study uses a methodology first introduced by Roll (1988) to test the ability of asset pricing theory to explain ex-post stock returns based on pervasive factors, industry influences and events unique to the firm. Roll (1988) uses a regression of company returns on market and industry returns 4 and interprets the coefficient of determination (R²) of this regression as an inverse proxy for firm-specific information. High (low) R²s indicate that company returns are being explained more (less) by pervasive factors compared to firm-specific factors. To test if the unexplained component was the result of firm-specific information, Roll ran the regression again excluding observations on the dates on 4 Roll"s (1988) initial model has only market returns as an explanatory variable. The industry factor is added to improve the model"s coefficient of determination and, therefore, results in a more refined measure of firm-specific information. Roll (1988) uses the one factor CAPM and the multi-factor APT model; both models produce similar results.
which information about the firm or its industry appeared in the public domain. If the residuals were capturing firm-specific information, the R² of the second regression should be considerably higher. However, he found that deleting those dates did not increase R² significantly. Roll (1988: 566) concludes that an "occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information" was driving the results. Despite subsequent attempts to improve the methodology (Brown, 1999; Cornell, 1990; Robin, 1993) et al. (2000) show that R²s are higher in countries with poorer economies that are often characterised by weaker corporate governance and investor protection mechanisms, as measured by a "good government index" based on La Porta et al. (1998) . 5 In the presence of weak property rights, information-based trading becomes less attractive, less firm-specific information is capitalised and, therefore, more stock price synchronicity is observed.
5 Morck et al."s (2000) research finds a significant and negative association between R² and countries" GDP. They hypothesise that GDP might be proxying for specific economic characteristics affecting stock price synchronicity. To test this hypothesis, the R 2 stock price synchronicity measure is regressed on the following structural variables: the natural log of the number of shares traded in the market, the country"s GDP and a vector of structural economic characteristic (macroeconomic volatility, country size, economy diversification, and earnings co-movement). Inclusion of these structural variables fails to mitigate the statistical significance of GDP. In contrast, the inclusion of the "good government index" renders the GDP coefficient statistically insignificant. Subsequent cross-country and firm-level research appears to corroborate these results.
6 Jin and Myers (2006) find that countries where firms tend to be more opaque 7 have higher R² and higher frequencies of crashes. Control rights and the opaqueness of information affect managerial behaviour and, therefore, higher R²s are associated with countries having less developed capital markets and weaker corporate governance regimes.
There is also a growing body of literature using the R² measure at the firmlevel (e.g. Durnev et al., 2001; Durnev et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) . Most of this literature uses the R²-methodology as proposed by Morck et al. (2000) without questioning its reliability. More recently, the informational interpretation of R² has been subjected to detailed scrutiny at this level.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) confirm Morck et al."s (2000) findings for a smaller set of countries but strongly disagree with their interpretation of the results. They document the non-existence of a relationship between R² and a set of firm-specific variables, such as analyst forecast errors, firm size and stock turnover, which might be expected to capture aspects of the quality of the firm"s information environment. Their results lead them to conclude that R² is not associated with firm-specific information and, therefore, cannot be used to compare countries from an informational 6 These studies have applied the R² methodology in a variety of settings and contexts. For example, it has been used by Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana and Van der Meulen (2009), Ding, Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2006) , Kim and Shi (2007) and Wang and Yu (2009) to examine the informativeness of changes resulting from the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It has been used by Li, Morck, Young and Yeung (2003) , Durnev, Li, Morck and Yeung (2004) , Khanaker and Heaney (2008) , Chan and Hameed (2006) , and Hsin and Liao (2003) to address various issues regarding the information and governance environments of stock markets in emerging markets. It is used by Ting (2008) to assess corporate disclosure policy and by Chung, Huang and Tseng (2007) regarding the impact of investor protection. In relation to the impact of cross listing, see Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) . 7 In their model, opaqueness refers to the lack of transparency between managers and investors.
perspective. These results are reinforced by Kelly (2007) slowly. This would lead to reliance on R² yielding erroneous conclusions about the quality of the firms" disclosure policies.
While most of the criticism has focused on the use of R² at the firm level, the results at the cross-country level have received less attention. Our study focuses on the plausibility of the behaviour of the R² measure per se in a cross-country setting and the sensitivity of the measure to how a "country" is defined. We impose on our research design no constraints of the kind developed in the above theoretical models.
METRICS AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
In order to assess the validity of R² as a measure of firm-specific information, we use regression to capture the level of stock returns explained by the market. We adopt the usual practice in cross-country studies using the R² methodology of not including an industry variable in the model because of the attendant difficulties in defining industries in countries with small capital markets (the majority of the sample). Unlike
Morck et al. (2000), we do not include US stock market returns as a variable because a firm"s exposure to the US market is better viewed as having two components, one being firm-specific and the other market-wide, the latter being captured by the market variable and the former by the residuals.
Our model, expressed in Equation (1), regresses company j's returns (RC jwt ) on the market"s returns (RM jwt ) and yields an R 2 value per company-year.
To mitigate thin trading problems, all returns are measured on a weekly basis (w) for each year (t). To prevent spurious correlations -more severe in countries with few companies -market returns are value-weighted averages excluding company j, as follows:
where RM jwt is the market return in week w of year t, excluding firm j, MV iwt is company i's market value for the same period and n is the number of companies in the market. RC iwt is company i"s returns in week w of year t. An annual R² value for the entire sample is then computed by weighting individual R 2 s within country c by SST, as in Equation (4) below. We adopt this approach for purposes of comparison with prior work and because it allows us to apply the same rationales as in Equation (3) ( 2000) and Durnev et al. (2001) , a small R 2 means that such pervasive factors poorly explain the company"s returns and, therefore, firm-specific information is driving the measure. These rationales, when applied at the country-level, suggest that in countries with high (low) R²s, market-wide factors are more (less) relevant in explaining stock returns relative to firm-specific information.
To aid comparability, our sample comprises data for the same forty countries used in Morck et al. (2000) , but covering a much longer period, 1985-2004 . These countries form a comprehensive set of active capital markets that are representative of capital markets worldwide.
For each country, we select the most comprehensive list of companies available in the database. We eliminate all duplicate records, both within and across countries (i.e., cross-listed companies). When deleting cross-country duplicates, we retain the observation from the country of origin. We exclude secondary issues of shares, companies where we cannot obtain all the required information, and companies that for a particular year have less than 26 weekly observations for returns.
Finally, to mitigate the influence of extraneous environmental and governance factors, we exclude companies classified as foreign for a particular market. Table 1 presents details of the composition of the final sample. Table 2 shows the number of companies per year in each country. The number of firms varies significantly across countries. Poland has the least firms, with an average of only 27 companies, and the USA has the most, with an average of 6,624
companies. The overall average per country is 342 companies (181 if we exclude the USA) and the median is 96 companies. There are missing data for earlier years for some countries. We deal with this missing-data problem by running our tests both for the whole period and for the period for which common data are available for all countries (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . We delete years when the number of firms in a country is below 20% of its average for the whole period. 9 All information was retrieved directly from CRSP for the US firms and from Datastream for all other countries. Our sample includes dead firms and financial companies.
A final difference between our sample and Morck et al."s (2000) is that we do not exclude extreme returns. In their study, all bi-weekly stock returns higher than 25% in absolute value are excluded as data errors. Prior detailed investigations on our UK sample, untabulated here, suggest that such extreme retunrs are much more likely 9 As a robustness check, we also replicate this sample selection criterion at 10% and 25%. Our results are not statistically sensitive to the choice of cutoff point.
to reflect important new information and as such are not simply due to measurement error. 10 Our reason for not excluding such extreme observations is to ensure all information effects are properly captured. (Sheskin, 2004) . Both Kendall"s tau and Spearman"s rho show a high degree of concordance, 0.75 and 0.83, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level, allowing us to conclude that there is a monotonic positive relation between the ranks in our study and that of Morck et al."s (2000) . As a further sensitivity check, we also re-ran all the analyses reported below, using a model identical to Morck et al." s that included US returns with exactly the same trimming of extreme returns at 25%. Untabulated results indicate that our overall results reported later in this paper remain substantially unaffected.
RESULTS

(i) Ranking Countries
We rank countries by their mean R² over the sample period to see if such rankings accord with commonly-held preconceptions of the quality of countries" information environments. In Table 4 Panel A, we can immediately determine that the rank produced based on the mean (last column) is inconsistent with an informational 10 In particular, we examined actual information releases for our complete sample of UK companies during the weeks in which the extreme returns were observed. We used the Perfect Information database and selected all returns above 200%. In 87% of the cases there was an information release about the company.
explanation. The Czech Republic and Portugal are in the top five and as such almost as good as the USA. Peru would be interpreted as having better corporate governance and investors" protection regimes than the UK, with Pakistan as being near equal to Japan, and both far better than Hong Kong. Table 4 Panel B ranks countries by individual year. The rankings exhibit considerable variability across time.
As a robustness test, Table 5 ranks the countries according to the R² average for the common data period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) rather than the whole period. Conclusions are even more puzzling for this sub-sample. Now the USA, generally acclaimed as the strongest capital market in the world, is only in eleventh place, behind countries like Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Peru and Portugal.
Clearly, whichever data set is used, the cross-country ranking of R 2 is extremely sensitive to the choice of year. Furthermore, one can observe from Table 4 Panel B that for some countries R² is erratic over time. 11 If corporate governance and other macro-economic factors are deemed mainly to explain the behaviour of the R² measure, then we would not expect to observe such extreme fluctuations as the ones
shown. There are 696 adjacent-year-country possible paired combinations. In 171 pairings we observe either an increase of at least 100% or decrease of more than 50%
in annual R². The number goes up to 324 pairings if we consider increases of at least 50% and decreases of 33% or more in R².
To test if the overall differences in R² from year to year are statistically significant, we apply a Single-Factor Within-Subjects Analysis of Variance based on the null hypothesis that the mean R² between years in the sample is constant.
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Untabulated results show that, after removing the country effect, the null hypothesis is rejected at both the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, confirming that that there is a significant difference between the mean R² for at least two of the years. These results hold both for the whole sample and for the common sample.
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We also examine whether there are significant changes between overall average R² for adjacent years. Untabulated results reveal that for 14 (10) (
ii) Effects of Aggregation and Decomposition
If R² is to serve as a reliable measure of the information environment it should not be affected unduly by the arbitrary aggregation of or subdivision of countries when selecting a measure of market returns. We address this issue by presenting the results of creating R 2 for "pseudo-countries" obtained by aggregating real countries based on different criteria described below and comparing them with the average of the R 2 for the original non-aggregated countries. We then explore the inverse approach by decomposing the American market into its three main stock exchanges.
Equation (5) represents the baseline we use to compute the R² for a single country. In this equation, the returns of firm i in country j (R ij ) are regressed on the market returns of country j, and then weighted by SST for the combined countries together to get the R 2 for the whole pseudo-country:
The same equation is used to compute the R² for a given pseudo-country. In this case, the pseudo-market return, RM, is generated using all companies in the n original country markets included in the pseudo-country. Fitting one model for n combined countries would result in a single composite index analogous to a value-weighted average of the individual countries, as shown in Equation (6):
In concept, fitting separate models for each country could be viewed as analogous to (but not quite the same as) fitting a single regression model with dummy intercepts and slopes for each country, as in Equation (7):
. (7) To the extent that the dummy variables are significant, and the explanatory power of the markets is differentiated, this model would result in a better fit. On the other hand, only if all the dummy variables were insignificant and the different markets had no differential explanatory power, would the resulting R² be similar to the one yielded by Equations (5) and (6).
(a) Examples of the Effects of Aggregation
Based on our data set, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the effects of aggregation of countries on R 2 discussed above. First, (2000) interpretation, the merging of the two countries would be interpreted as a significant increase in the strength of corporate governance and investor protection regimes and, therefore, in the overall quality of the information environment. For illustrative purposes, we applied the same procedure to other geographically neighbouring countries with similar results: China and Taiwan would apparently "increase" the quality of their information environment by 36%, Malaysia and Singapore would observe an "improvement" of 24% and, finally, Australia and New
Zealand of 34%, for example.
Second, the same effect is observed if we combine countries instead of by geographical proximity, by similarity in R 2 , details of which are given in Table 6 Panel B. Pseudo-country E, for example, includes six countries (Ireland, New
This aspect is not considered in this paper.
Zealand, Peru, United Kingdom, Brazil, and Australia), all with an R²s between 0.06 and 0.07; by merging them we observe a 40% reduction in R². Other combinations selected by similarity in R 2 show even larger reductions in merged R 2 . Pseudo-country F (Germany, India, South Africa, Finland, Indonesia and Sweden), for example, which also has a variation in R 2 between the original constituent countries of only 0.01, has a 74% reduction in R².
Finally, we also examine the behaviour of R 2 where pseudo-countries are created by merging actual countries based on an external and non-R 2 -based selection criterion. In particular we combine countries based on similarity of S&P transparency and disclosure rating scores (Doidge et al., 2004) . The results, reported in Table 6 Panel C, show similarly declining merged R 2 scores. This final basis for constructing pseudo-countries could be regarded as particularly compelling, given that it provides us with an externally determined measure of some common dimensions of each country"s corporate governance quality. Again, the aggregation of these informationenvironmentally similar countries has resulted in approximately a 50% reduction in
R².
The above examples demonstrate that aggregation does indeed reduce R².
The reason is that instead of fitting n models, one per country, to determine R² we are now fitting only one model to n countries. We are effectively forcing the parameters to be the same across the n populations, as outlined and discussed analytically in the previous section. If the parameters in the separate models are significantly different, the aggregated model loses part of its ability to fit the data and a lower R² results. In all the above examples, untabulated Wald tests reveal that these parameter restrictions are highly significant.
(b) An Example of the Effects of Disaggregation
We now do the opposite by disaggregating one country, the USA, into three pseudocountries, each corresponding to one of its three major stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE). We know in advance, of course, that each pseudo-(subdivided) country has almost the same institutional framework. Needless to say, we might still expect some differences. In spite of these differences, all are under the regulatory umbrella of the SEC and apply the same accounting rules. All have a similar analyst environment and corporate governance and investors" protection regimes. However, if we look at Table   7 Panel B without prior knowledge of the name of the particular stock exchange (as if the R²s were from different countries), we would conclude that the country called NYSE has the worst information environment of the three pseudo-countries because it 15 Significance levels are high. 70% are significant at the 1% level.
has the highest R 2 . The other two "countries" have somewhat similar R 2 s. It could be argued that we ought to observe the opposite ranking: the NASDAQ and AMEX pseudo-countries comprise smaller and more technology-intensive companies. Smaller companies will be less closely followed by analysts and might have less sophisticated governance regimes. The value of technology-intensive companies will be subject to greater uncertainty because they are more dependent on growth options. For both types of company, these factors might lead one to conclude that they have worse information environments and, as such, their pseudo-countries ought to have higher R 2 s. In passing, one might also note the similarity in R 2 of the NYSE with the South American country, Colombia (see Table 3 Panel A). It is difficult to believe that the information environments of the NYSE and the Bogota Stock Exchange are of similar quality.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper presents a cross-country analysis of the use of R² as a measure of information. Our results lead us to conclude that R 2 is inadequate as a measure of the quality of the information environment at a country level. The rationales advanced in the literature for the use of country R² as a measure of information have been based on the implicit assumption of stability of country corporate governance and investor protection regimes. It is inconceivable that such factors could change as rapidly and unpredictably as do the changes in country R 2 . Our study also reveals substantial aggregation and disaggregation problems with interpreting R 2 as a measure of the quality of the information environment at a country level.
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where RM jwt is the market return in week w of year t, excluding firm j, MV iwt is company i's market value for the same period and n is the number of companies in the market. RC iwt is company i"s returns in week w of year t.
The annual R² value for period t for the entire country c, is then computed as a weighted average of the individual company R 2 s. The weights used for that period are of the individual company"s regression total sum of squares SST jt in the above equation, to SST ct. which is the country aggregate of the individual company regression total sum of squares for all companies in that country.
In Panel A of Table 4 , countries are ranked by the mean country R² for the whole period for which data about that country is available.
In Panel B, within each year countries are assigned a rank for that year based on the country R 2 "s calculated as in Panel A (where "1" = lowest country R 2 for that year). Countries are ranked according to the mean annual rank ("1" = lowest rank). 
The annual R² value for period t for the entire country c, is then computed as a weighted average of the individual company R 2 s. The weights used for that period are of the individual company"s regression total sum of squares SST jt in the above equation, to SST ct. which is the country aggregate of the individual company regression total sum of squares for all companies in that country. Table 5 ranks countries according to the mean annual R 2 ("1" = lowest company R 2 ) for the common sample period 1997-2004. 85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03 where RM jwt is the market return in week w of year t, excluding firm j, MV iwt is company i's market value for the same period and n is the number of companies in the market.
RC iwt is company i"s returns in week w of year t.
The annual R² value for period t for the entire country c, is then computed as a weighted average of the individual company R 2 s. The weights used for that period are of the individual company"s regression total sum of squares SST jt in the above equation, to SST ct. which is the country aggregate of the individual company regression total sum of squares for all companies in that "country".
The "average" row for each grouping indicates the average values for that year of the individual countries" R 2 "s which comprise each "pseudo country", and overall average R 2 for the full sample period for that grouping.
The "Pseudo-country" row for each grouping indicates the R 2 "s for that year for the pseudo-country itself, computed on the basis as described above. These are based on all companies in the particular combined pseudo-country, and overall average pseudo-country R 2 for the full sample period for that grouping.
The column headed "Change" shows the percentage change (always a decrease) between the particular pseudo-country"s whole period R 2 and the whole period average R 2 for the countries in the pseudo-country grouping, taking the latter as 100%.
